State Business Relations and Performance of Manufacturing Sector in Andhra Pradesh – A Case Study
ABSTRACT
In this paper, we make an attempt to enquire into the politics of state-business
relations, how it has affected industrial development in general, and expansion of the
manufacturing sector in the State of Andhra Pradesh (AP) in particular. In AP, SBRs
have evolved gradually under different political regimes - from 'indifferent' SBRs
during the initial decades passing through critical junctures in the form of 'active' and
'proactive' phases and finally reaching their zenith during Chandrababu Naidu’s
regime and continuing in the Congress regime. The SBRs in AP are seen evolving
through different political regimes, and we have sought to capture their impact on
the performance of manufacturing sector, based on both qualitative and quantitative
sources. Examination of the secondary data reveals the dominance of registered
manufacturing in AP’s total manufacturing output. Firm level perceptions reveal that
business associations play a major role in the dissemination of information, rather
than in lobbying the government as might be the case in other states. Small firms are at a disadvantage compared to large and medium firms.
1
State Business Relations and Performance of
Manufacturing Sector in Andhra Pradesh – A Case
Study
G Alivelu¹, K Srinivasulu² & M Gopinath Reddy³
Discussion Paper Series
Thirty One
November 2009
IPPG Discussion Papers
available at
www.ippg.org.uk
IPPG Programme Office, IDPM, School of Environment & Development
University of Manchester, Arthur Lewis Building, 2.023, Oxford Road
Manchester M13 9PL; Telephone 0161 306 6438; ippg@manchester.ac.uk
www.ippg.org.uk
2
¹Centre for Economic and Social Studies, Hyderabad, India
²Osmania University, Hyderabad, India
³Centre for Economic and Social Studies, Hyderabad, India
Paper prepared for the DFID-funded Research Programme, Institutions and Pro-Poor
Growth (IPPG). The authors are grateful to DFID for the funding that made this
research possible. The views expressed in this paper are entirely those of the author
and in no way represent either the official policy of DFID or the policy of any other
part of the UK Government.
Material published by the IPPG may be reproduced free of charge in any format or
medium provided it is reproduced faithfully, not used in a misleading context and
properly attributed to the author(s). Copyright exists in all other original material
published by members of the Programme and may belong to the author or to the
University of Manchester depending on the circumstances of publication. Enquiries
should be sent to the editor at the above address.
3
CONTENTS
PAGE
Abstract 4
1 Introduction 5
2 Data and methodology 6
3 Mapping the politics of SBRs in AP and its impact on industrialisation 7
3.1 Neelam Sanjeeva Reddy (1956-60 and 1962-64) 8
3.2 First Critical Juncture: Shaping SBRs under Kasu Brahmananda 10
Reddy government (1964-71)
3.3 Pro-Active SBRs: Jalagam Vegal Rao (1973-78) 11
3.4 NTR Regime (1983-1989): Neglect of SBRs 13
3.5 Second Critical Juncture: Chandrababu Naidu Regime (1995-2004) 16
3.6 Congress Regime (2004 - ): continuation of pro-SBRs? 28
4 Interaction of institutions and organisations in determining manufacturing 29
Activity
4.1 Employment in the Manufacturing Sector 29
4.2 Labour Productivity in organised and unorganised sectors 32
4.3 Registered Manufacturing Sector 32
5 SBR and firm level perceptions 33
5.1 SBR and Infrastructure 34
5.2 Industrial Unrest 35
6 Conclusions and policy implications 35
References 38
Appendices 42
4
ABSTRACT
In this paper, we make an attempt to enquire into the politics of state-business
relations, how it has affected industrial development in general, and expansion of the
manufacturing sector in the State of Andhra Pradesh (AP) in particular. In AP, SBRs
have evolved gradually under different political regimes - from 'indifferent' SBRs
during the initial decades passing through critical junctures in the form of 'active' and
'proactive' phases and finally reaching their zenith during Chandrababu Naidu’s
regime and continuing in the Congress regime. The SBRs in AP are seen evolving
through different political regimes, and we have sought to capture their impact on
the performance of manufacturing sector, based on both qualitative and quantitative
sources. Examination of the secondary data reveals the dominance of registered
manufacturing in AP’s total manufacturing output. Firm level perceptions reveal that
business associations play a major role in the dissemination of information, rather
than in lobbying the government as might be the case in other states. Small firms
are at a disadvantage compared to large and medium firms.
Key-Words: State-business relations, political regimes, institutions, manufacturing
sector.
5
1 INTRODUCTION
The developmentalist role of the post-independent state has been a major factor in
the industrialisation of India. The conscious government policy effort with public
investment and the establishment of the public sector enterprises and of economic
infrastructure projects have an obvious influence upon the industrial scenario in the
States. Industrial development thus has been the result of conscious government
policy effort with public investment playing a crucial role. However, with the recent
major change in the industrial policy regime, the importance of private investment
has increased enormously.
This raises the question why despite ‘uniform’ central policy framework some States
perform better than other States in terms of industrialisation? Is it due to the
differential policy interventions undertaken by the State governments or is it because
of the relationship that exists between the State government and the business
environment?
Given its expansion, the State’s role in ensuring developmental success or failure
deserves serious analytical attention (Sinha, 2005). In this context, effective statebusiness
relations (SBRs) or public-private sector cooperation can play the role of an
important determinant of economic growth at the macro level (Sen et al., 2007).
According to Hariss, good SBRs are based on benign collaboration between business
and the state with positive mechanisms that enable transparency, accurate and
reliable information flow between business and government; ensure the likelihood of
reciprocity; increase credibility of the state among the capitalists, and establish high
levels of trust between public and private agents. They provide a transparent way of
sharing information, lead to a more appropriate allocation of resources, remove
unnecessary obstacles to doing business and provide checks and balances on
government intervention. Further, effective SBRs lead to a more optimal allocation of
resources in the economy, including an increased effectiveness of government
involvement in supporting private sector activities and removing obstacles to
investment (te Velde, 2006). Governments that engage in good SBRs are thought to
a have a higher likelihood of adopting appropriate policies and reforms, while
enterprises participating in state-business discussions are more likely to support
these initiatives (Bannock, 2005; Herzberg, etal., 2005).
6
It is against this background that it becomes important to understand the nature and
status of industrial development in the State of Andhra Pradesh (AP) with respect to
the State’s policy incentives or disincentives. Furthermore, we intend to concentrate
on the role of the government in Andhra Pradesh, in initiating the processes of
reinventing the industrial sector in general and the manufacturing sector in
particular. The policy of re-industrialisation and re-emphasis on manufacturing
assumed importance as the probable response to certain critical conditions – such as
increasing inequality, massive poverty, rising unemployment and declining quality of
life for a large number of people and so the crucial question is: can the state in
post-colonial societies play a significant role in the processes of economic
development as it did historically in the development of the now-advanced countries
(Polanyi, 1957; Gerschenkron, 1962), while simultaneously projecting its image as
pro-people and pro-poor (Basu, 1991)?
Given these issues, the central objective of this paper is to examine the politics of
the government and business relation and how it affected the industrial development
in general and expansion of manufacturing sector in particular in AP.
2 DATA AND METHODOLOGY
The SBRs in AP seen evolving through different political regimes and their impact on
the performance of manufacturing sector is sought to be captured based on both
qualitative and quantitative sources. The key informant interviews involving a large
number of stake holders associated with policy making such as ministers,
bureaucrats, former and serving, who held important positions like that of secretary,
commissioner and managing director of industrial corporations (like AP Industrial
Development Corporation Ltd. (APIDC), AP Industrial Infrastructural Corporation Ltd.
(APIIC) ), members of the apex business associations (like Federation of Andhra
Pradesh Chamber of Commerce and Industry (FAPCCI), Federation of Andhra
Pradesh Small Industries Association (FAPSIA), Association of Lady Entrepreneurs of
Andhra Pradesh (ALEAP) form important source of qualitative information. The
quantitative information dealing with the performance of manufacturing sector is
drawn from data sources of National Accounts Statistics published by Central
Statistical Organisation (CSO). Apart from the secondary data, this paper also draws
its evidence from exhaustive field work completed in four research sites in Andhra
7
Pradesh (Sanathnagar, Jeedimetla, Gajularamaram and Nacharam). The data was
collected during December 2008 and February 2009. (For methodology on secondary
data and sampling for primary survey see appendix 1). The information collected
through interviews is complemented by macro-economic data at the State level.
3 MAPPING THE POLITICS OF SBRS IN AP AND ITS IMPACT ON
INDUSTRIALISATION
Andhra Pradesh, formed in November 1956 by the merging Telangana region,
consisting of nine Telugu-speaking districts of the erstwhile Hyderabad State with
eleven districts of the Andhra State, has been a strong bastion of the Congress party
since its formation in 1956. It is only with the emergence and coming to power of the
Telugu Desam Party (TDP) in 1983 that the dominance of the Congress in the State
was challenged. The Congress dominance in State politics coincided with the
Congress dominance at the centre as well, except for the brief span of Janata rule
(1977-80) in the post-Emergency period. This means that there was a long period of
harmony between the centre and the State at political party and governmental
levels. It is therefore interesting to examine the impact of this on the process of
industrialisation in the State and assess how far the AP State could make use of this
for the above purpose.
Three critical factors in shaping SBRs are: ruling political elite, bureaucracy and
business classes. While the political class can play a crucial role in creating a positive
environment for industrialisation by making appropriate policies, creating and
enhancing the capacities of the institutions and by making crucial appointments, the
bureaucracy through its pro-active role can identify the potential actors and
smoothen the process by evolving policies, formulating strategies and activating
institutions and functionaries so that time and cost involved can be taken care of.
The critical factor in forging crucial impulse for better SBRs is the domestic business
class. The presence of this can act as a pressure on the former and make them act
positively.
In the history of SBRs in AP it could be noticed that there is a certain degree of
asymmetry between these factors. For the first decade after the State formation, the
political leadership was not very enthusiastic towards industrialisation partly because
8
of its social roots and also because of the absence of a catalytic factor, that is, an
active capitalist class, to exercise pressure on the regime. It is only since the mid-
1960s that pro-business initiatives could be seen taking shape, though agriculture
still constituted the focus of the economic policy making. It is only in the post-Green
revolution period that we witness the emergence of an aggressive rural rich, along
with an educated elite emerging from the rural landed classes with wider exposure to
technology, management and industry within India and abroad, which could look
beyond agriculture for opportunities of investment and enrichment and attempt to
influence the policy regime in the State.
3.1 Neelam Sanjeeva Reddy (1956-60 and 1962-64)
The Congress regime in the early decades of the State formation focused on agrarian
sector and rural development. The series of land and tenancy reforms and the
launching of the panchayat raj system and rural development programmes during
the 1950s and 1960s point to the priorities of the regime. What in fact got a boost as
a result of this were the agriculture and allied sectors, like the handloom industry.
The Chief Ministers (CM) like Neelam Sanjeeva Reddy (1956-60 and 1962-64) were
known not to be very pro-active towards the growth of the industry, especially with
respect to the involvement of private industrialists. In fact, it emerges from the
interviews with the administrators who happened to work with him that he
considered industrialists to be greedy and corrupt, a reflection of the peasant outlook
of the early generation of agrarian based political elite. As a result, it is not an
exaggeration to suggest that the only industrialisation that we see in AP was largely
due to the initiative of the Central government and to some extent the continuation
of the State government’s support to the existing public sector industries. During this
period, the central government made considerable investment in industry in the
State resulting in the establishment of large public enterprises.
Thus, a major part of the history of State was characterised by a system of
patronage that essentially banked on contracts in irrigation, rural development
sectors and Public Works Department (PWD) work1. The phenomenon of contractor
class which enriched itself on the state’s expanding developmental activities is an
important aspect in the phase of transition of the agrarian landed classes to the
1 Interview with BPR Vittal, IAS (Retd), August 2009, Hyderabad.
9
urban economy. It is the nexus of the politician-contractor class that has been one of
the key elements in the constitution of the ruling party support base.
The absence of enthusiasm for industrial development in the State can easily be
assessed. The most visible factor in this of course was the absence a strong business
class which could act as a driving force and put pressure on the government for a
positive policy dispensation. On the contrary, as suggested earlier, in AP we witness
the rise and expansion of a parasitical class that banked on political patronage and
enriched itself on the government civil contracts. This was in contrast to the
experience of Gujarat and Tamil Nadu which had historically seen strong industrial
class impulses. In addition, the mutual political and economic security implicit in
such a cozy relationship between the political elite and the contractor class seems to
have inhibited the latter from making any moves into business that could involve
risks.2 Furthermore, the absence of initiatives on the part of the political elite for the
first two decades despite the political access to centre and visibility of opportunities
to industrialise the State contributed to the missing of the opportunity. In spite of
the similarities between AP and Gujarat in terms of centre-State relations, the
contrast in terms of industrialisation remains striking because of the agrarian outlook
of the political elite in AP.
2 Interviews with most of the civil servants who served these regimes thus opined. Interviews with BPR
Vittal, TL Shankar, IAS (Retd) and BV Rama Rao, IAS (Retd) and former Chief Secretary , Government of
AP.
10
3.2 First Critical Juncture: Shaping SBRs under Kasu Brahmananda Reddy
government (1964-71)
The credit for giving a positive turn to the state-business relations in the AP State
goes to the Brahmananda Reddy’s government (1964-71). It was during the 1960s,
partly as a part of the all-India process, that institutions, meant to support and build
up industrial base in the State, were set up and activated. An attempt to compare
and contrast AP’s industrial performance with States like Tamil Nadu and Gujarat
were made and the reasons for trailing behind them were understood to be due to
the absence of initiatives to attract private capital to the State.3
The AP Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. (APIDC) was set up in 1960 with
the objective of promoting rapid industrialisation in the State. The role of APIDC in
the industrialisation in AP in 1960s and 70s was significant. It had three roles: i) to
provide industrial license to entrepreneurs through some sort of single window
clearances; ii) to provide financing; and iii) promotions through road shows. The AP
State Financial Corporation (APSFC), started in 1951, is an important body (Krishna,
1989). The AP Small Scale Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. (APSSIDC) was
established in 1961 to promote the interests of small scale industry. The AP Agro
industries Development Corporation Ltd. (APIDC) and the AP Industrial Infrastructure
Corporation Ltd. (APIIC) were set up in 1968 and 1973 respectively.
For positive SBRs, Brahmananda Reddy emphasised that the role of bureaucracy in
terms of formulation of policies and creation of interactive administrative culture is
crucial. To create such environment, he entrusted the task of interacting with the
business elite to positively inclined officials and he also made a special financial
provision to take of the cost of such interaction. It was during this period that
provisions for financial assistance, concessions and subsidies, providing valuable land
at cheap price were made. As a result, we see many industrialists coming forward to
set up industries in the State.
3 Interview with TL Shankar, IAS (Retd), October 2008, Hyderabad.
11
3.3 Pro-Active SBRs: Jalagam Vegal Rao (1973-78)
Jalagam Vengal Rao’s tenure as CM (1973-78) is considered to be an important
phase in the history of SBRs in AP. While taking forward the initiatives of
Brahmananda Reddy government, he emphasised the importance of leadership and
decision making styles in forging good SBRs. The major obstacle for it is the
notorious red-tapism in the functioning of governmental organisations. To overcome
this, he identified and entrusted the task to trusted and dynamic bureaucrats4 who
are seen as committed to this objective. One step forward in this direction is to give
freedom to them from any kind of interference.
Initiatives like the Backward Area Development Programme aimed at the
development of backward areas by identifying their industrial potential and providing
them with appropriate incentives and linkages. Vengal Rao was also instrumental in
strengthening APSFC, APIIC and APSSIC. These initiatives resulted in significant
changes in the industrial scenario in the State.5 As a result, for instance, a number of
forest-based industries like paper mills came up in the private sector in the place of a
small 10 ton capacity paper mill in the public sector in Rajahmundry.
At this juncture, we will focus on the most debatable subject in the phase of
industrialisation in an economy: the existence of a very strong industrial licensing.
AP occupied the last but one position in terms of industrial licenses issued to
different states during late sixties, but after 1970, AP occupied the fifth and sixth
positions with regard to the issue of ILs (see appendix 2). Thus, AP could attract
sufficient new investments into the industries during 1970s due to the proactive
decisions taken by the State government and leaders like Jalagam Vengal Rao. But,
did this trend continue in the later years also during the tenure of other chief
ministers? Our data on letters of intent (LOI)6, Industrial Entrepreneur Memorandum
4 Interview with Prof R K Mishra, Director, Institute of Public Enterprises, Hyderabad, October 2008.
5 As part of this exercise and also to ensure transparency a committee, comprising of both ruling and
opposition leaders was constituted to make recommendations. Interview with TL Shankar, IAS (Retd),
October 2008, Hyderabad.
6 LOI is the response to the application that the prospective entrepreneur has to make to the Secretariat
of Industrial Approvals (SIA) to enable the entrepreneur to apply for other clearances such as land, power
and capital goods or an import license (if applicable). After receiving various clearances, the entrepreneur
applies for what is known as the Conversion of an LOI to an industrial license (CIL or IL), (Sinha, 2006).
12
(IEM) 7and investment proposals (refer section 3.4 and appendix 4) reveals this
aspect.
The subsequent CMs, especially during 1978-1983, were not known for any
significant contribution to the SBRs in the State. It was a period in the history of the
State, that despite a clear electoral mandate, the Congress party could not ensure a
stable government. Frequent change of CMs (four CMs in a period of five years),
continuous intervention of the Congress High Command, and encouragement to the
factional fights rendered this period the most unstable period of the Congress rule in
the State. As a result of the political uncertainty, which was the making of the
Congress leadership, the SBRs suffered a serious setback. The conspicuous absence
of political direction pushed the SBRs into ‘a state of coma’8. The following analysis
captures the situation vividly.
The analysis of comparative manufacturing sector backwardness of AP in 1964 in
relation to some of the more important States in India reveals that Andhra Pradesh
stands last amongst the seven States in terms of percentage share of productive
capital, employment, gross output and value added (see Appendix 3). This slow
growth in industries till the mid-sixties can be attributed to the fact that
industrialisation in AP primarily confined itself to agro-processing industries during
Neelam Sanjeeva Reddy’s tenure. But, thereafter, shifts have been taking place
towards foot-loose type products based on imported inputs from other regions
producing for national markets (Rosen, 1988; Reddy, 1989). A scheme of incentives
for setting up of industrial units was first introduced in the State in 1966 and was
made more attractive in 1969. The Central Investment Subsidy Scheme introduced
(CISS) in 1970 covered 14 districts. Further, the revision of CISS in 1976 resulted in
structural diversification within the manufacturing sector. The changes in the sectoral
income shares over a period of time are indicative of above structural changes taking
place in AP (Table 1).
7 Industrial investment is registered separately for the de-licensed and licensed sectors. Investment
intentions in the former sector are registered in the form of Industrial Entrepreneurs’ Memorandum.
8 Interview with Prof R K Mishra, Hyderabad, October 2008.
13
Table 1: Sectoral income shares in AP economy: 1970-71 and 1982-83 at 1970-71
prices
Sector 1970-71 1982-83
Primary 56.38 49.26
Manufacturing 8.77 10.56
Registered 4.12 5.46
Unregistered 4.66 5.10
Secondary 13.43 16.23
Tertiary 29.40 34.51
Source: AP Statistical Abstract, GoAP, Hyderabad
3.4 NTR Regime (1983-1989): Neglect of SBRs
We have seen earlier that Jalagam Vengal Rao’s tenure as CM (1973-78) is
considered to be an important landmark in the history of SBRs in AP. But, the
emergence of Telugu Desam party (TDP) under the leadership of NT Rama Rao
ushered in a phase of negative SBRs in AP. NT Rama Rao (NTR) came to power in
1983. He signaled two important shifts in AP politics: one, the rise of anti-Congress
and anti-Centre rhetoric; two, the regionalist populism. The TDP, as its rise is
opposed to the politics of the Congress party, took a vehemently anti-Congress
stance and which as a consequence translated into anti-Centre rhetoric as the
Congress was in power at the centre. By widening the scope of anti-Congressism, the
TDP along with other non-Congress parties and governments in the country sought
to play a key role in the national politics by demanding a democratic rearticulating
the centre- State relations.
The second important aspect signaled by NTR’s political ascendancy was anchored to
the Telugu cultural and identity politics. Thus, his first tenure in power (1983-89)
was dominated by the rhetoric of cultural populist politics. In tune with this populist
thrust, policies/ schemes comprising of Rs 2 per kilo of rice, subsidies to farmers,
housing for the poor were emphasised. To sustain these schemes, when in the later
years the expenditure on these schemes increased many fold, the regime sought to
find a solution by boosting up the liquor sales.9
9 For an assessment of the impact of rice subsidy scheme on State government's indebtedness, Olsen
(1989).
14
During NTR’s tenure, the anti-centre politics and populist policies and uneven thrust
on agriculture in their combined effect led to the neglect of the industry. Despite
this, it may be observed that the manufacturing sectors like handloom industry
which is a major employer in the State after agriculture was paid adequate attention
essentially as a source of rural employment through Janata cloth scheme
(Srinivasulu: 1994, 1996). It is sad to note that not only industrial development saw
a setback but even cinema industry, to which he owed his popularity, was pushed
into a crisis with the introduction of the ‘slab’ system.
This is clearly evident from the data on LOI and IL in the A P State (appendix 4). It is
argued that the pro-business shift in the central government in India in the 1980s
was reflected in those States where the political party in power was aligned with the
central government (Rodrick and Subramanian 2004). As a consequence of this,
States aligned with the central government benefited the most and AP unfortunately
is not one such State.
The neo-rich agrarian class of the coastal Andhra region that emerged as a result of
the political economy of Green revolution and constituted the principal social
constituency of the TDP found the lack of enthusiasm on the part of NTR to be
slowing down its transition to the non-farm sectors. For it was during the 1970s and
1980s that we observe a major shift of the agrarian families of the coastal Andhra to
agro-processing, hotel, and film industry along with service sector. This potential
with a proper political and policy direction could have been the basis of an energetic
expansion of the industrial base of the State, unfortunately it were not to be (see
table 2). What could instead be noticed was the response of the regime to a limited
group of local industrialists and professional NRIs who could benefit from its
patronage to expand into the education, hospital, pharmaceutical, media and service
sectors.
15
Table 2: Average Annual Growth Rates of State Domestic Product from the
Manufacturing Sector in AP during 1980-81 to 1992-93
Year Manufacturing Registered
Manufacturing
Unregistered
Manufacturing
1980-81 to 1983-
84
5.97 8.52 2.71
1984-85 to 1987-
88
4.70 6.02 2.70
1988-89 to 1992-
93
1.88 1.58 2.50
Source: NAS
Three principal social forces that exhibited a strong potential to expand the industrial
base of the State were: i) the market oriented rich peasant class in the Green
revolution areas of coastal Andhra region that has grown into a matured class eager
to expand into trade and business; ii) the artisanal skill base, especially in handloom
and power loom sectors, could have been used to make the sectors competitive and
export-oriented; iii) the enthusiastic entrepreneurial Non-Resident Telugus, the bulk
of whom consist of Kammas (the core social constituency of NTR’s political base), if
properly encouraged could have played a significant role in the industrial growth of
the State.
In addition, the very political and policy discourse of the TDP proved to be
detrimental to a proper growth enhancing SBRs. Firstly, the TDP’s emergence is
premised on anti-Congressism and once in power, the TDP regime not only continued
its anti-Congress stance but further expanded it by pursuing anti- centre (as NTR
famously said “centre is a myth”) politics in a vigorous manner thus displaying his
national political ambition. Secondly, the social coalition the regime forged was
defined essentially in caste-cultural terms (Other Backward Castes (OBCs), women
and minorities) that beyond the populist cultural, it failed to take cognizance of the
long term economic interests of coalition partners and implications of such a populist
policy dispensation. Thirdly, the populist welfarist policy dispensation became such
an obsession that the regime literally became blind to the (anti-) developmental
implications of populist policies.
16
Thus the absence of a proper perspective on the SBRs has not only led to the loss of
an opportunity to expand the industrial base of the State but also paved the way to
its counter-point that is fast-track reforms by the subsequent regimes that pushed
large sections of agrarian and artisanal sections and working people into a serious
economic and social distress as evident in the large scale occurrence of starvation
deaths and suicides in the State.
3.5 Second Critical Juncture: Chandrababu Naidu Regime (1995-2004)
NTR came to power in the 1994 assembly elections with a huge popular mandate
which was attributed to his populist agenda of subsidised rice scheme, power subsidy
to the agrarian sector and total prohibition in the State among other promises. He
was soon displaced by his son-in-law Chandrababu Naidu in the 1995 August coup
which is often interpreted as an internal affair of the NTR’s family and party. An
analysis of the drama seen in the proper context and in relation to the subsequent
developments clearly shows that it was not a simple event of change of guard of the
TDP but a contestation that involved different social classes, especially the
entrepreneurial class which successfully directed the crisis to a finale; one of the
dramatis persona being the owner of the leading Telugu dailt Eenadu. (The role of
Eenadu is worth noting). In other words, the leadership crisis in the TDP was
effectively used by the disgruntled capitalist class which was restless with the
populist policies and obsessive self-image driven governance of NTR.
Chandrababu Naidu’s regime, in tune with the desire of this social class which was
instrumental in bringing him to power, played a pro-active role in building an image
of AP being an industry-friendly and pro-business State. Naidu brought about a
remarkable shift in the style of functioning of the office of CM. Unlike the earlier CMs,
Naidu was forthcoming with a direct and almost one-to-one dialogue with the
industrialists, thereby conveying the message that his government was businessfriendly
(table 3).
17
Table 3: Average Annual Growth Rates of State Domestic Product from the
Manufacturing Sector in AP during 1993-94 to 2005-06
Year Manufacturing Registered
Manufacturing
Unregistered
Manufacturing
1993-94 to 1996-
97
8.39 7.82 9.71
1997-98 to 2000-
01
1.72 1.32 2.52
2001-02 to 2005-
06
6.37 7.15 4.79
The decline in the growth rate of registered manufacturing sector during the late
nineties and early 2000 can be attributed to the growing sickness of certain
categories of small scale industries. The apparent reasons for the high occurrence of
sickness among the small scale units may be due to defective financial planning,
obsolete technology, power and energy shortage and also the problems related to
the supply of raw materials. Also, during this period Chandrababu Naidu
concentrated on the growth of IT sector in the State. Thus, In AP, the tertiary rather
than the secondary sector has become the engine of growth. One of the major
sources of the high growth of services in SDP has been the recent emergence of the
IT sector in Telangana10 region (Chakravarty and Alivelu 2009). Though the policy
regime changed under reforms, which deregulated and got rid of bureaucratic
controls, the responsibility for the necessary reforms was left to the States. The
requirements for the licenses, permits and inspections at the State and local level
continued to be onerous as the enterprises faced difficulty in procuring land,
electricity and water connection. Secondly, there was a credit squeeze in 1996,
based on the quality of the credit, which also seemed to have dissuaded industrial
producers from plans to expand their production and import technology
(Vaidyanathan, 1995).
Theoretically speaking, effective SBRs result in a decline in ambiguity surrounding
the firms, positively influencing their performance. In this regard, a measure that we
can include is a firm’s opinion about getting a clearance for a proposed initiative. The
10 Andhra Pradesh consists of three regions – Telangana, Coastal Andhra and Rayalaseema
18
higher the problem of uncertainty, the lower would be the effectiveness of SBR.
Furthermore, we also make an attempt to include the percentage of senior
management’s time spent on addressing government regulations/officials/and paper
work. Good SBRs are expected to lower the administrative constraints faced by the
firms (Qureshi et al, 2007).
Settings of Industrial and Related Procedures:
Large vs. Small Firms Experience
Our firm level analysis shows that for already established firms, be it large or
medium, getting permission for setting up a new production unit, or expanding the
existing one or acquiring land, is not a problem. It involves the normal official
procedure and there are no hassles in getting clearance for the proposed initiative.
However, the small and the medium firms which are into business for a short period
of time face lot of procedural hassles with respect to the above issues (for some it
takes more than a year).
To quote an instance, when a small entrepreneur who is in manufacture of fast food
items, started a food retail outlet in a building by investing huge amount of money,
which they were told is a commercial complex. After few months, they were told
that it is a residential area, and their trade license was cancelled. When the
entrepreneur put lot of efforts, trade license was given for a period of one year, but
again was withdrawn after the completion of one year. So they had to shut down the
outlet despite investing huge amount of money.
With regard to the senior management’s time spent on addressing government
regulations/officials/ and paper work, large and medium, on an average, spend 30 to
40 percent of their time on the above issues. Most of them have their own
consultants from within the office cadre. For the small firms, there emerges a
different picture. On an average, they spend nearly 60 to 80 percent of their time on
governmental procedures. To sum up, good SBRs are expected to lower the
administrative constraints faced by the firms. But, this appears to be true only in the
case of large and medium firms and not in the case of small firms.
In this context, we can observe that capital formation assumes overriding
significance in the milieu of the policy making by the State and central governments.
19
During the nineties and early 2000, as is evident from appendix 5, the creation of
assets occurs more in the private sector compared to the public sector, both at the
State level and All India level. This signals the pro-business attitude of the State
government encouraging the private entrepreneurs to invest in the industrial sector.
It can also be seen that though the capital formation in the private sector hovers
around 65-70 percent, role of private sector is lower than the country average
indicating the need for further push (see appendix 6).
Here it becomes important to note that the shift brought about by the launching of
the second generation of economic reforms, involving the reduction of subsidies,
downsizing of public employment and privatisation of PSEs in which the States are
crucial actors. The committee under the chairmanship of Subramaniam constituted
by the NTR government to go into the question of crisis of PSEs in AP came in handy
to Naidu. The committee in its report submitted in June 1995 recommended far
reaching changes: closure of 9 PSEs; partial disinvestment in 10 PSEs; privatisation
of 2 PSEs; restructuring 7 PSEs.
The international institutions like the World Bank and DFID needed a State and
persona to be projected as the role model. Naidu with his enthusiasm was found to
be a much needed poster boy. The national and international attention from the
donors, western media and pro-reform political and policy elite catapulted Naidu into
the global circuit.
The strong presence of Telugus among the NRIs added strength to this image. It
may be recollected that NTR in the 1980s build up linkages with the Non-Resident
Telugu associations, especially in the USA. But he used them basically as a spring
board for his cultural politics of Telugu pride. These networks were not drawn upon,
at least in a concerted manner, for furthering business investment during NTR’s
tenure. Naidu with a focused direction appealed to the Non-Resident Telugus to
invest in AP (see table 4).
20
Table 4: FDI Proposals State-wise (August 1991- May 2002)
State Number of
approvals
Amount of
FDI approved
(Rs. in
millions)
Percent
(share in all
India)
Andhra Pradesh 1010 130687 4.66
Tamil Nadu 2152 232360 8.29
Gujarat 1049 184533 6.58
Maharashtra 3959 486602 17.35
Orissa 136 82290 2.93
West Bengal 591 88024 3.14
All India 21926 2804421 100
Source: Indian Investment Centre, http://iic.nic.in (percentages calculated
based on the data)
It may be noted that the Telugus who went to the US in the 1960s and 70s were
mostly educated professionals. Some of them, especially in the medical and software
sectors, graduated to be entrepreneurs and venture capitalists. Naidu aimed at
tapping this potential by emphasising on the importance of knowledge economy and
the ability of AP to tap the opportunities in this sector. Thus the regime found strong
sources of ideological legitimacy to its attempt at policy reorientation in the
international institutions and media, NRIs and internally in the domestic
entrepreneurs, local media and the educated middle classes.
With the 1999 assembly and the national elections establishing him as the
undisputed leader of the TDP, Naidu speeded up the reform process, launched
earlier. What is to be noted here is that the reforms here were not merely aimed at
improving SBRs through institutional and organisational changes but in fact
advertised a major revamping of the governance structure through IT ES to ensure
SMART (Simple, Moral, Accountable, Responsive and Transparent) governance.
Naidu’s pro-SBR strategy consisted of two aspects: one, creating a pro-business
discourse and two initiating strategic and institutional changes. This is reflected in
the investment proposals granted to the State of AP during his regime continuing
well beyond into the congress regime (appendix 7).
21
The formal institutional changes attempted included creation of single-window
clearance11 that sought to avoid the bureaucratic delay; simplification of approval of
projects; institutionalising wide range of incentives like tax holidays and exemptions,
creation of infrastructural facilities, provision of subsidies for land, water, power,
transport, etc; relaxation of labour and contract laws (exemptions from labour
inspections, permission for three shifts, etc). The determination to pursue reforms
are made amply evident through the reversal of the populist thrust of the earlier
regime and the initiation of unpopular measures like the unbundling of the Andhra
Pradesh State Electricity Board (APSEB) recommended by the AP Electricity
Regulation Commission set up in 1999 to review the working of SEB.
How efficiently government is organised is as crucial as the organisation of the
private sector for SBRs. To measure the role of government in state-business
relations, we consider the firm’s perceptions about the efficiency of government in
delivering services (for example, availability of road and railways, availability of
warehouses, availability of industrial estates) on a scale of 1 (= very inefficient) to 5
(= very efficient). As well as this, the provision of telecommunication facilities,
supply of electricity, supply of water etc., also become crucial in the judgment of
SBRs.
Efficiency of Government and Service Delivery
The majority of the entrepreneurs rate the performance of the government in
delivering services like roadways as satisfactory (3 on a scale of 1-5). They also felt
that there is improvement in the service delivery of roadways over the last five
years. On a scale of 1-5, the performance of roadways was rated as 2 five years ago,
now, it is 3. However, a few small entrepreneurs do not agree to the above opinion
and rate the service delivery of roadways as inefficient (2 on a scale of 1-5) now and
also five years back. This is true especially for the small exporters. They judge the
performance of roadways based on the costs incurred in moving the products from
one place to the other. They find it extremely difficult to export their commodities as
11 Quite to the contrary, the single window system did not seem to have worked the way it was intended
on the ground. This comes out very clearly from the interviews not only with business association leaders
but also with some bureaucrats and academics.
Interviews with B. G. Sastri, Former President of FAPCCI, B V Rama Rao, IAS (Retd.) October 2008,
Hyderabad and Prof R K Mishra, Director, IPE, Hyderabad.
22
they have to incur huge expenditure in transporting their commodities. One small
entrepreneur expressed extreme difficulty in this aspect. She said that as she had to
bring edible oil from Vijayawada to Hyderabad and then export it, she had to face
huge transportation costs in moving her product from Vijayawada to Hyderabad.
With respect to the availability of industrial estates, members of Association of Lady
Entrepreneurs of AP (ALEAP) are happy in spite of not having proper
telecommunication facilities within the estate. However, one entrepreneur belonging
to the medium firm doing business (chemical sector) from industrial estate within the
city (Sanathnagar) states that he is forced to relocate his firm as the government
feels that the firm produces hazardous substances. Yet another problem faced by
the firms is the stringent rules of pollution. Most of the firms doing business from the
industrial estates within the city like Sanathnagar, Nacharam etc., are asked to
either shut their business or relocate as the firm releases effluents which cause
pollution hazards. One small entrepreneur cited the harsh rules associated with
pollution as an example of bad SBR. The other firms on an average gave 4 on the
scale of 1-5 for the availability of industrial estates.
Only one firm gave 3 on a scale of 1-5 for the availability of warehouses.
Firms and Infrastructure
Almost all the firms depend on the State electricity board for power supply and are of
the opinion that there is no problem with respect to electricity supply. During
summer, when there are power cuts, management operates shift system and runs
the production process accordingly. All those industrial firms in Gajularamaram
industrial estate set up by ALEAP can avail free power up to the capacity of 13 HP,
over and above that they have to pay for the power.
The firms are satisfied with the provision of water facilities by the government. In
the industrial estates of Jeedimetla and Sanathnagar, firms have formed into a
society and society provides water to various firms. In Gajularamaram, where ALEAP
has its industrial estate, there is no water connection and the entrepreneurs procure
water through water tankers.
23
With regard to telephone connections, large and medium sized firms do not face any
difficulty. They say that they now get the connection immediately after applying
while it would take two to three months, five years earlier. About 10 years back, to
get a telephone connection, the firms had to wait for more than a year. On the
contrary, small firms feel that getting a telephone connection is a Herculean task
even now. One small entrepreneur was not able to get the telephone connection for
her firm as the department asked for submission of too many papers. Not able to
tackle the cumbersome procedure involved, she got the telephone connection in the
name of the larger business group of which she is a part. Despite the mobile
revolution, getting a telephone connection from the state telephone department is a
difficult task for the small entrepreneurs.
Andhra Pradesh: Vision 2020 (Government of A P: 1999), a document prepared by
international management consultancy firm McKinsey in 1998, was presented as the
official statement of the long-term policy direction of the regime.12 Identifying
nineteen growth engines across different sectors of the economy, it promised to
move the State economy from agriculture to a diversified economic growth path. It
also saw governance reforms that ensure efficiency, transparency, accountability and
speed as essential ingredients of the vision. It is necessary to note that the
document found favour with the educated middle classes as much with the corporate
world thereby generated a positive public response and provided ideological
legitimacy to its reforms.
Naidu regime brought about a perceptive informality, hitherto unknown, in its
relation with the business houses, associations and leaders. Frequent interactions of
the CM and his officials with the businessmen in the Secretariat, in the social
gatherings and business association meetings and the CII and FICCI conferences
were to find regular reporting in the media. Media was used to send the message of
new dispensation of the regime. Media, given its corporate connections, willingly
participated in this discourse by giving prominence to this dimension of the regime.
What role do these organisations play in the State of Andhra?
12 For critical analyses, see D N Reddy (ed), 1999.
24
Business Associations and their Interaction with the Government
Firm analysis at the field level shows that all the firms (large, medium and small) are
members of business associations. The majority of them are members of Federation
of Andhra Pradesh Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FAPCCI). This observation
contradicts the argument that there is no business case for large firms to join
business associations (BA) as they could lobby government directly. Though the
large firms have more access to the government and bureaucrats and can approach
the government directly, they take membership in the BAs. This membership keeps
them informed about the various initiatives and policies undertaken by the
government. The large firms, in fact, by being members of BAs cater to the needs of
the small firms by giving them guidance on policy matters, helping the BA in
organising the workshops and sharing their work experiences with the other firms in
the association. The women entrepreneurs have membership in Association of Lady
Entrepreneurs of Andhra Pradesh (ALEAP). There exists a cordial relationship
between the associations and the government. The associations are made part of the
budget discussions. The presidents of these BAs interact with the government
officials as and when the necessity arises.
In terms of the services, providing information on government regulations is the
most significant service provided by business associations to the firms covered in the
sample. This view was echoed by all the firms in the sample. Most of the firms
accorded 4 and 5 on a scale of 1-5 where 1 (very inefficient) and 5 (very efficient).
The members are also happy with regards to the performance of FAPCCI in terms of
conducting workshops, training programmes etc., to enhance the capabilities of the
members. FAPCCI publishes its newsletter regularly and the information is uploaded
on the website for the benefit of the members. The issues deliberated with the
government are informed to all its members on a continuous basis. The meetings are
conducted regularly and as and when a particular issue arises, a separate meeting is
again convened. Our findings also reveal that providing information on government
regulations appears to be the most effective service of the FAPCCI. But, when it
25
comes to the issue of lobbying the government, the members of FAPCCI strongly feel
that that the service provided by the association in this regard is not satisfactory.
Again, on a scale of 1-5, firms accord 2 in this regard. When we pondered over this
issue with the FAPCCI committee members, they said that they try their best to help
the members.
Women Entrepreneurs and ALEAP
However, members of ALEAP are at an advantageous position as the women
entrepreneurs feel that the association lobbies with the government wherever
necessary. This association was established in 1993 with an aim to bring together
women entrepreneurs trying to help each other and work in collaboration for welfare
maximisation. ALEAP developed the First Women Entrepreneurs Industrial Estate in
India at Gajularamaram, Ranga Reddy district of AP. The estate has all the required
infrastructural facilities to transform women into outstanding entrepreneurs. It is a
state level organisation with an objective of uplifting women and empowerment
through establishing small and medium enterprises. ALEAP’s members are mostly
first generation entrepreneurs and ALEAP through its strong support network with
government and non-government organisations, provides the expertise and other
required facilities for entrepreneurship development. The association is also
developing another industrial cluster for women entrepreneurs in Food Processing at
Vijayawada. They have their own counsellors who give them advice on various
business activities. Their Centre for Entrepreneurs Development (CED) provides
entrepreneurship abilities to the women and contributes to State’s economy. On the
one hand, the small firms which are part of FAPCCI feel neglected; on the other
hand, small firms in ALEAP are quite satisfied with the services provided.
ALEAP also conducts training programmes, workshops and entrepreneur
development programmes. The recent achievement of ALEAP is that some of the lady
entrepreneurs are sent to the Indian School of Business for a course on
entrepreneurial development. As an association, ALEAP has strong reach and tie-ups
with retail outlets and supply chain stores. ALEAP members have been recognised by
large scale industries as strategic vendors in manufacturing their products. To quote
26
the efforts put in by ALEAP in helping the women entrepreneurs, one small
entrepreneur informed us she bagged a contract from Bharat Heavy Electrical
Limited (BHEL) to supply tubes to the company because of the initiation of ALEAP.
In fact, she displayed her product (she is a manufacturer of light weight grills which
she supplies to the apartments around the estate) at an exhibition organised by
ALEAP wherein the large scale industries visited the exhibition. When BHEL showed
interest in her product she pursued with them and bagged the contract from it. The
company, in turn, gave specifications for the manufacture of tubes. As she is
technically not equipped with knowledge, she is planning to take help from her
husband who is an engineer and also employ skilled workers. While FAPCCI does not
provide any financial assistance to its members, ALEAP, on the other hand,
endeavors to provide financial assistance to its members in the form of ALEAP Credit
Guarantee Association (ACGA). Members of the association will be provided financial
assistance from Andhra Bank without collateral security.
Small Firms and FAPSIA
Yet another association that caters to the needs of the small firms is the Federation
of Andhra Pradesh Small Industries Association (FAPSIA). This was established in
1992 and disseminates information in the form of annual reports, monthly
newsletters, training courses and seminars. The association claims that it plays a
major role in influencing the budget and government spending plans. The incentives
for SSIs take the form of discounts, subsidies on power, tax refund, reimbursement
of local taxes, special incentives to women entrepreneurs etc. Despite these
initiatives, why is it that the small entrepreneurs feel neglected? This is one area
which needs to be probed further.
To conclude, the effect of SBR works primarily through provision of information on
government regulations and lobbying government. FAPCCI which has a large
membership in comparison to ALEAP is successful in provision of information on
various aspects to its members and does not play much role in lobbying the
government. ALEAP, though successful on both the parameters, owing to its limited
27
membership confined to lady entrepreneurs, indicates that the main activity of these
associations is dissemination of information. If the business associations play an
active role in lobbying the government, then the SBRs become more meaningful.
Organisational changes in the government-business relations include the rise in the
prominence of the APIIC as the nodal agency for facilitating the project preparation,
land acquisition, providing infrastructural facilities, etc. Officials with pro-corporate
aptitude and dispensation are identified and assigned the responsibilities and made
duly accountable. There job was to produce the results.
The developments pertaining to the promotion of the Information Technology (IT)
sector highlights the changes in the discursive, institutional and organisational style
during Naidu’s regime. The construction of the HITEX City, consisting of Cyber
Towers and Cyber Gateway, which began in 1995 under Public Private Partnership
(PPP) soon after Naidu’s coming to power, for the promotion of the IT sector,
became the symbol of the regime change in the State and Cyberabad (as distinct
from the twin cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad) as its locale. Soon reputed IT
giants like Infosys etc., gravitated to it. The establishment of the Microsoft School for
Software Technology (MSST), the first R&D centre by the Microsoft outside the US
along with the Indian Institute of Information Technology (IIIT) in Hyderabad is
considered to be major achievement of the Naidu government. The Naidu
government specifically tried to showcase the HITEC city as a demonstration of its
pro-business dispensation.
What is worth noting here is that Information Technology is not just seen as a sector
capable of generating employment and incomes but also as a mechanism to put in
place a system of good and transparent governance. Governance reforms and IT as
an instrument of improving governance to “smoothen the interface citizens and
business has with the government, by making the latter more responsive” but also to
“improve internal efficiencies, integrate services…” [Naidu: 2000, p. 83]
Behind this showcasing of the IT and so-called Cyberabad as the face of AP ‘shining’,
there was a gross neglect of the rural economy and the manufacturing artisanal and
modern industrial sector. The projected development could not assuage the
28
grievances of the majority of the population dependent on agriculture and allied
occupations. Their anger caused him an electoral defeat in 2004 [Srinivasulu: 2004.]
3.6 Congress Regime (2004 - ): continuation of pro-SBRs?
The Congress came to power in 2004 by articulating the agrarian and rural crisis. In
tune with its electoral promises, agriculture was high on the Congress agenda. As a
consequence, agricultural development and irrigation attracted huge attention. But
this has not resulted in the neglect of the industry (table 5).
Table 5: State wise status of Industrial Entrepreneurs Memorandum Implemented in
India August 1991 – October 2006 (Rs. Crores)
States IEM Proposed IEM implemented
No. Investment
amount
No. Investment
amount
Andhra
Pradesh
4734 199113 507 14525
Tamil Nadu 5798 139930 438 9638
Gujarat 8242 352601 1121 68810
Maharashtra 12451 290855 961 29106
Orissa 1026 166877 52 1843
West Bengal 3844 85968 475 28963
Source: Indiastat.com
Though AP’s performance, in terms of investment proposals implemented, is
satisfactory, the government has to think seriously about how to attract more
investors into the economy. In the new industrial policy, 2000-05, for creating an
appropriate organisational structure to achieve speed in decision making in matters
concerning industrial projects, the State Investment Promotion Board (SIPB) was
formed. The SIPB will meet once in a month for the purpose of taking a final decision
regarding investments and promotion of industries in the State. However, the
majority of the investment projects in the State remain in the announcement State
in contrast to the claims of successive governments on promoting an industryfriendly
environment (The Hindu, 6-11-09).
In its Industrial Policy of 2005-2010, the State government provided 15%
investment subsidy on fixed capital investment subject to a maximum of Rs.15.00
lakhs to SSIs and an additional investment subsidy of 5% on fixed capital investment
29
limited to Rs.5.00 lakhs for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribe (SC/ST)
entrepreneurs. The government also extended cent per cent exemption in stamp
duty for lands allotted to SC/ST entrepreneurs. To boost more industrialisation in the
State, women entrepreneurs were also given incentives in this industrial policy.
One significant initiative by the Congress regime that has a direct bearing on the
SBRs is its pro-Special Economic Zone (SEZ) initiatives. With 57 notified and 99
formally approved SEZs, AP has acquired a dubious distinction of being one of the
leading States in terms of the number of SEZs. The pro-active role of the
government could be gauged from the fact that of these 30 SEZs have been
developed by the APIIC and couple of them by other government agencies. While as
many as 95 SEZs are related to the IT and IT-enabled services sector, the number of
multi-purpose SEZs is just eight. Most of these IT/ITES SEZs instead of attracting
new companies have only resulted in the relocation of the old ones for availing tax
incentives. With serious doubts raised about their role in advancing industrialisation,
they assumed notoriety as land acquisition gave rise to allegations of land scams and
large scale displacement of rural population in these areas resulting in local protest
movements.
4 INTERACTION OF INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANISATIONS IN DERTERMINING
MANUFACTURING ACTIVITY
In this section, we focus on the performance of the manufacturing sector in the State
during the period 1980-81 to 2005-06.
4.1 Employment in the Manufacturing Sector
At the all India level, manufacturing sector employment has increased both in the
rural as well as in the urban areas in 2004-05 over 1993-94.and the State of AP
corresponds to the national picture (Table 5).
Table 5: Employment in the Manufacturing Sector in Some Selected States: Rural
and Urban
(per thousand work participation rates by the usual status)
30
States
2004-
05
Rural
1993-94
Rural
2004-05
Urban
1993-94
Urban
AP 86 69 195 191
Orissa 111 64 140 166
WB 135 161 276 302
Maharashtra 56 50 242 249
Gujarat 78 92 372 310
Tamilnadu 140 129 309 299
Karnataka 62 67 217 231
India 81 70 246 236
Source: NSS Report No. 409, 515 (Vol. 2)
However, at the All India level, AP stands in the second to last position in terms of
employment in urban areas, while it stands at fourth position, in terms of rural
employment in 2004-05. The better position of rural employment in AP is due to the
growth of construction activities. We can always argue that there is an increase in
employment when it is coupled with the increase in the wage rates. Most of the
authors like Goldar, 2000, Venkatramaiah et al, 2003 contend that the organised
industrial sector experienced a rise in employment growth in early 2000, but that is
due, mainly to decline in real wage growth. So the above increase in employment in
the manufacturing has to be taken with a pinch of salt.
Table 6: Percentage Share of Unorganised Manufacturing Employment in total by
some States classified by Rural and Urban, 2001
States
Rural Urban
Andhra Pradesh 9.9 (3) 7.0 (6)
Bihar 5.2 (6) 0.7 (14)
Gujarat 2.3 7.1 (5)
Haryana 0.7 1.8 (11)
Karnataka 5.3 (5) 5.8 (7)
Kerala 3.5 1.7 (12)
31
Madhya Pradesh 4.1 3.6 (9)
Maharashtra 5.2 (6) 13.2 (2)
Orissa 8.6 (4) 1.0 (13)
Punjab 1.4 3.1 (10)
Rajasthan 2.7 3.8 (8)
Tamil Nadu 0.7 13.5 (1)
Uttar Pradesh 15.4 (2) 13.1 (3)
West Bengal 18.4 (1) 11.1 (4)
Source: NSS, Report No. 479; Unorganised Manufacturing Sector in India:
Employment, Assets and Borrowing, 2000-01 Note: Here, India as a whole
has been considered as 100, Figures in the parenthesis indicate ranks
In urban areas, Tamil Nadu takes first position, while AP stands at the sixth position
in its share of unorganised manufacturing employment in the country (Table 6). On
the other hand, in rural areas, while West Bengal stands at the first position, AP
stands at the third position. Economic reforms were expected to encourage
employment in the informal/unorganised sector; but activities within the unorganised
sector which are expected to be relatively better paid – as they draw their growth
momentum from the demand side factors – do not seem to have generated job
opportunities on a large scale in urban areas (Arup et al, 2006)
When we take into consideration total employment in the manufacturing sector,
manufacture of tobacco and tobacco products generate the highest share of
employment in 2001 when compared to the other sectors (appendix 8). The
dominance of beedi-making activity has resulted in more employment generation by
this sector. Table 7:
Compound growth rates of manufacturing employment: organised and unorganised
(in percent per annum)
States
1981-82 to
1991-92
1991-92 to 2001-
02
Manufacturing 1.03 2.69
Organised 1.89 0.89
AP
Unorganised 0.62 3.51
Source: Population Census and Annual Survey of Industries
32
Rate of growth of employment of the manufacturing sector as a whole increased in
the second period over the first in the State (Table 7). However, it is the
unorganised sector which has actually contributed to the increase in the rate of
growth of employment and the rate of growth of employment in the organised
manufacturing shows a decline in the second period over the first in AP. Have
economic reforms reduced employment growth in the organised sector? It is possible
that economic opportunities have not increased in the post-reform period in spite of
higher growth. Furthermore, the lower growth in organised employment can be
attributed to the slowing down in employment in the public sector enterprises. The
closure of many sick units could have resulted in the decline in the growth of
employment in the organised sector. The increase in the unorganised sector
employment is due to the expansion in construction activity and the beedi industry in
the State.
4.2 Labour Productivity in organised and unorganised sectors
Labour Productivity (O/L) in the registered manufacturing sector shows an increase
during 1987-88 to 1992-93 (Appendix 9). This trend continued till 1996-97 and
thereafter registered a steep decline in 1998-99. Then O/L started fluctuating and
then registered an increase in 2003-04 (Appendix 10).
What about the labour productivity in the unorganised sector in AP vis-à-vis the
other States? (Appendix 11). When we compare the State of AP vis-à-vis the other
States, we observe that the GVA per annum both by rural and urban workers is low
in AP. Thus, while labour productivity in the organised sector showed an increase,
the labour productivity in the unorganised sector is not encouraging.
4.3 Registered Manufacturing Sector
Considering the importance of manufacturing sector within the industrial sector in
general and registered manufacturing in particular, we decide to narrow down our
focus.
33
We now take stock of the situation concentrating only on the latest year13 (2003-04)
for which the ASI data are available at the State level. It is important to mention
here that we have considered net value added figures for output, total persons
engaged for labour and the value of fixed capital for capital.
Share of Net Value Added (NVA) and the productive capital of chemical, food
products and basic metals constitute around 47 percent of the total manufacturing in
2003-04 (Appendix 12). Though the share of NVA of tobacco is low when compared
to that of the food and beverages sector, it generates employment almost double its
share of NVA. Further, non-metallic mineral products generate the highest share of
employment as compared to the other sectors.
5 SBR AND FIRM LEVEL PERCEPTIONS
Transaction costs associated with regulations, bureaucracy and poor institutions,
reflect resources diverted from production and may have significant implications for a
firm’s performance (World Bank, 2004; Groot et al. 2004). In this context, through
conducting a primary survey, we make an attempt to capture these external factors
by considering the total number of inspections during the year and measures for
corruption.
Transaction Costs and Rent Seeking : Firms’ Experience
Almost all the firms except one large and one medium (with a niche for themselves)
have said that they have to pay bribes for the inspections to take place. At the same
time, they do agree saying that there is no harassment from the government
inspectors. To quote, “It’s a part of the system and we have to accept it” are the
words uttered by majority of them. To answer the question of whether the number of
visits come down once the payments are made, the reply is that the mandatory visits
do take place even after payment. The only hassle they face is that some of the
inspectors may delay the process of giving a final decision after the visits if the
bribes are not paid on time. In fact, one small entrepreneur said that she makes it a
point to visit the officials on the occasion of festivals and give them bouquets, sweet
13 We have considered the industrial categories having shares of five percent and above.
34
boxes or even greeting cards to keep them in good humour.
Thus, though there exists the practice of unofficial payments to the officials who
carry on with the mandatory inspections visits, almost all the firms’ feel that there is
no harassment from the officials.
5.1 SBR and Infrastructure
Variations in risk and infrastructural conditions explain a good deal of difference
between the levels of domestic and foreign investment taking place in the economy.
We know that infrastructure plays an important role in attracting industrial
investment into the economy. Secondary data in this section makes an attempt
towards this direction.
Physical and social infrastructures are important for economic growth and higher
human development. Economic infrastructure like transport, communication and
power facilitates accelerates the growth of economic activities and contributes to the
national or State GDP (Dev and Ravi, 2009). In AP, the contribution of the transport
and communication sector to total GSDP at current prices was 6.31 percent in 1960-
61 and it increased to 7.94 percent in 2004-0514.
The total road length in AP in 1956-57 was 17086 kms; on average, this was 6.21
kms per 100 sq. kms and 0.55 kms per 1000 population (Dev and Ravi, 2009). The
total road length increased to about 71.32 per 100 sq.kms of geographical area as
on 31st March, 2003 (Appendix 13). This is again due to the policy initiatives adopted
in the State Industrial Policy 2000-0515.
With regard to post offices and telephone connections, in AP, there were around 21
post offices and 4121 telephone connections per lakh population as on March 2005.
Despite improvement in infrastructure in the State, the infrastructure index
presented in the report of the Tenth and Eleventh Finance Commission for major
14 Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of AP, 2005
15 Infrastructure facilities such as roads, electricity, water, drainage etc., to be provided at the door step of the proposed
industry in the areas identified by the State Government as industrial areas. Government also facilitates creation of allied
infrastructure such as telecommunication facilities including internet connectivity and information kiosks, transportation
links from industrial areas to towns (bus service), Housing complexes nearer to industries, container depots and exhibition
halls by promoting private participation.
35
Indian States shows that the index value for AP for 1995 was almost close to all
India (i.e.100) and it was ranked 10 among the fifteen major States. In 2000, the
index value and rank of the State had improved marginally to 103 and 9 respectively
(Dev and Ravi, 2009)
5.2 Industrial Unrest
Yet another important measure of the existence of good SBRs is the absence of
industrial unrest. Appendix 14 and 15 show that there is no industrial unrest in the
State of AP. This is further complemented by the primary survey analysis.
SBRs and Industrial Relations in AP
In the State of AP, all the firms said that cordial relations exist between the
management and the workers. Trade unions do exist, employees are members of the
trade unions, but, whatever problem arises, they are sorted at the firm level itself.
No firm has cited a major problem associated with labour. This is in tune with our
secondary data analysis on industrial unrest. However, our interaction with the
Centre of Indian Trade Union (CITU) President reveals that there is a decline in the
role of the trade union due to contractualisation of labour and suppression of trade
union rights. The President16 strongly feels that the government is playing the role of
pro management rather than pro worker. To cite an example, the contract labour act
has been amended to recruit contract labour even in core sector. Further, the
minimum wages which used to be revised once in two years has been amended and
made once in five years. Earlier, seven members were required to form a registered
TU, but, now, 100 or 10 percent of the total work force is required to register as a
TU. As a consequence, the TUs are not strong enough to fight with the management
for their rights.
6 CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
In AP, SBRs have evolved gradually under different political regimes – from
‘indifferent’ SBRs during initial decades (Sanjeeva Reddy period), passing through
16 Interview with Sri Veeraiah,, CITU, August, 2009
36
critical junctures (during K. Brahmananda Reddy and Vengal Rao tenures) in the
form of ‘active’ and ‘pro-active’ phases and finally SBRs reaching a high point during
Chandrababu Naidu’s tenure and there after continuing in the Congress regime. The
shift in the political regimes’ approach to the SBRs is positively correlated to the
political economy of change in the post-green revolution period. Two critical factors
in this process are the emergence of a market savvy agrarian class and the
emergence of a modern middle class as a result of the expansion of the modern
education; the proclivity on their part to look for alternative avenues of investment
played a key role. The government’s initiatives, both institutional and financial, seen
since the 1960s corresponded to this scenario.
Thus, from the lens of historical and institutional perspective, we attempted to
examine the performance of the manufacture sector which in turn affected economic
growth. Examination of the secondary data reveals the dominance of registered
manufacturing in the total manufacturing output of the State. However, the growth
in the output did not contribute to increase in the employment in this sector. The
growth rates of employment in the manufacturing sector increased in the second
period (1991-2001) over the first period (1981-1991), however, this increase is
contributed by the unorganised sector. From the employment viewpoint, there is no
harm, if unregistered sector employment increased, as long as the wage differential
between the two sectors is not significant. Our data on GDCF shows that during
nineties and early 2000, creation of assets is more in the private sector as compared
to the public sector. This signals the pro-business attitude of the State government.
The situation of investment is also improving considerably. The Socioeconomic
survey of 2008-09 reports: ‘after introduction of industrial policy in 1991, up to 31st
March, 2009, the State has received IEM 6,630 proposals with an investment of Rs
4,16,304 crores providing employment to 11,08,607 persons. Out of the above
proposals, 2,883 have already gone into production. The State has received Rs12017
crores of FDI inflows as equity from January 2005 to September 2008.”
Our primary survey analysis shows that out of the various services provided by the
business association, providing information on government regulations is the most
useful for the firm. Incidentally, we find that joining a business association is
particularly useful for the large and medium scale firms. The survey clearly brings
out the fact that the apex business organisation, FAPCCI, does not do much with
37
regard to lobbying the government. However, the efforts of ALEAP in this direction
are laudable. But, owing to its limited women membership, it is not able to cater to
the needs of large section of the manufacturers. In this context, it becomes highly
essential, on the part of FAPCCI to lobby with the government apart from
dissemination of information to its members hence becomes cheaper on the part of
the firms. With respect to the firm’s perceptions about the various facilities, such as
roadways, power, water and telecommunications provided by the government,
majority of the firms are satisfied with the facilities provided by the government.
Both the secondary and primary data reiterate that there exist cordial relation
between the management and the labour leading to the conclusion that there is no
industrial unrest in the State. However, our interactions with the trade union leaders
indicate that the rigid laws associated with the formation of trade unions and the
contractualisation of labour may be the reason behind the absence of industrial
unrest in the State.
Overall, our findings support the view that an organised private sector and effective
state business relations are helpful for firm performance, and state business relations
have improved over time in AP. The political environment of the State provides a
market friendly atmosphere and signals the pro-business attitude. The SBRs in the
State will become more meaningful if the small firms are also promoted on par with
the large and medium scale firms and if the following policy implications are made.
To step up the pace of state business relations, the government should take steps to
provide the best infrastructural facilities to make the State the manufacturing hub for
national and international companies. Since the majority of the investment projects
in the State are remaining at an announcement stage, there arises the need to set
up a special nodal agency with powers to settle issues affecting the investment
projects in the State. For small and mega industries, the government should make
the allocation of funds towards incentives for industrial investment promotion policy,
provide rebate on power tariff, set up exclusive industrial parks in those sectors
which provide employment opportunities, allocate at least 15-20 per cent of land for
Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSME) sector and help in reviving sick SSI
units. For the uplifting of the workers, the minimum wage revision period should be
made once in two years rather than once in five years and also provide employment
security to the workers.
38
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42
APPENDICES
Appendix 1: Data and Methodology for Secondary and Primary Data
In order to capture the performance of the manufacturing sector in AP, we have to
look mainly at two crucial variables relating to this sector such as employment and
output. National Accounts Statistics (NAS) published by the Central Statistical
Organisation (CSO) provide time series data for net state domestic product (NSDP)
in terms of broad industrial classifications at the single digit level. From this source,
it is easy to get the output figures at the state level. The total employment figures
are available in the Economic Tables of the Decennial Census.
The period for analysis chosen for studying the output variable is 1980-81 to 2005-
06. Currently, the data for state domestic product (SDP) are available in 1980-81
prices for the period 1980-81 to 1997-98. Another series is available from 1993-94
onwards till 2004-05 in 1993-94 prices. In order to get continuous data, researchers
have converted the data with 1980-81 as a base to conform to 1993-94 prices
(Bhattacharya et al 2004). However, the definitions used in constructing the 1993-94
wholesale price index are considerably different from those used for the construction
of the index numbers with 1980-81 as base. As this difference of definitions can
influence the numerical values to a considerable extent, it was decided not to
combine the two series (Chakravarty and Alivelu, 2009). Since our objective is to
look into the performance of the manufacturing sector, we decided to narrow down
our focus. The data set for the registered manufacturing sector is provided by the
Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) published by the CSO. The wholesale price index
numbers with 1981-82 as base for the first period were used for deflating the net
value added and the emoluments. We have deflated the fixed capital figures by an
index of machine tools. In order to calculate the trend growth rates we have fitted a
semi-log equation.
The sampling method adopted for the field work is as follows: We concentrated on
the organised manufacturing only. The problem we have in hand is to (a) classify the
sectors and then to (b) classify the firms.
43
(a) ASI classifies the sectors under manufacturing at the two digit, three digit and
in some cases even at the four digit level. We propose to take up the
relatively broader classification following the two digit level. We first classified
the sectors on the basis of labour capital ratio. For the sake of convenience
we considered only the latest year. The sectors will be classified in terms of
labour capital ratio as high (H) and low (L) taking the state manufacturing
sector average labour capital ratio as the dividing bar.
(b) Secondly the sectors were again classified by their levels of total factor
productivity as high (H) and low (L) taking the manufacturing sector average
for the state as a whole as the benchmark. This two way classification gives
us a four fold classification of all the sectors such as HH, HL, LH and LL. From
these four fold classifications we can possibly choose those sectors which
constitute at least five per cent of the total manufacturing net value added of
the state. This way of classifying the sectors is likely to ensure sufficient
contrast for comparison.
Finally we categorised the sectors based on TFP and labour capital ratio as High-
High; High-Low: Low-High and Low-Low. Based on the percentage share of net value
added and the above specified methodology the sectors that we selected in AP are
Manufacture of Food Products and Beverages (15); Manufacture of Machinery (29);
Manufacture of Chemical and Chemical Products (24), Manufacture of Basic Metals
(27); Manufacture of Coke, Refined Petroleum Products and Nuclear Fuel (23)
(c) The second task ahead of us was to decide the criteria of selecting firms
within the selected sectors. This is a more difficult task as the details about
the firms under each sector may not be readily available. However, this
problem was sorted out by classifying the firms based on the size in terms of
employment and age in terms of year of establishment.
Total Factor Productivity
Higher than the State Average
(H)
Lower than the State Average
(L)
Labour/ Capital
ratio
Higher
Than the
Machine tools
Percentage share in the NVA:
Food products
Percentage share in the NVA:
44
State
Average
(H)
5.61
Number of firms selected: 1
Size: small
14.61
Number of firms selected: 5
Size: small
Labour/ capital
ratio
Lower than
the State
Average (L)
(a) Chemicals
Percentage share in the NVA:
19.37
Number of firms:3
Size: One large, one medium,
one small
(b) Basic metals
Percentage share in the NVA:
13.19
Number of firms:5
Size: two large, two medium,
one small
Manufacture of refined coke
etc.
Percentage share in the NVA:
7.72. Firms in this sector could
not be covered because of
negative attitude of the firms
Appendix 2: Industrial Licenses issued to different states in India 1965-76
Year®
State↓
196
5
196
6
196
7
196
8
196
9
197
0
197
1
197
2
197
3
197
4
197
5
197
6
AP 24 19 11 4 6 13 37 30 29 61 61 51
Gujarat 39 33 29 23 16 39 66 57 78 89 97 83
Tamil
Nadu
59 29 18 7 12 36 51 36 64 99 141 61
Maharash
tra
134 109 100 66 80 112 162 131 183 265 255 143
Punjab 24 31 16 14 7 39 45 52 44 107 109 52
West
Bengal
64 42 48 34 62 46 81 54 47 107 74 56
Bihar 61 53 23 12 7 22 24 18 9 24 15 17
Orissa 5 8 2 2 3 4 7 4 0 12 10 7
Source: Reproduced from Raychaudari, 2007
45
Appendix 3: Productive capital, employment, gross output and value added in
select few states in 1964 (percentage)
State Productive
capital
Employment Gross output Value added
Maharashtra 17.29 19.83 24.11 25.62
West Bengal 19.65 22.00 21.77 22.29
Madras 7.74 8.39 8.18 8.51
Gujarat 6.47 8.63 8.30 7.97
Bihar 6.98 5.58 6.70 6.98
Uttar Pradesh 7.25 7.33 6.92 5.89
Andhra
Pradesh
4.00 5.00 3.50 3.00
Total for seven
states
69.38 76.76 79.48 80.26
Source: Naidu, 1965
Appendix 4: Letters of Intent and Industrial Licenses (IL) issued to different states
in India, 1983-1991
Year®
State↓
1983 1986 1989 1991
LOI IL LOI IL LOI IL LOI IL
AP 79 63 111 40 103 37 58 12
Gujarat 115 115 105 86 133 49 101 34
Tamil Nadu 68 76 104 61 119 44 68 28
Maharashtra 155 171 173 96 198 72 173 54
Punjab &
Haryana
113 228 104 73 119 29 64 21
West Bengal 45 71 42 21 33 14 28 3
Bihar 30 9 18 9 15 5 7 5
Orissa 25 14 17 12 24 4 12 6
Source: Indiastat.com
46
Appendix 5: Gross Fixed Capital Formation by Type of Institutions
Year AP All India
Public Private Public Private
1995-96 5967
(34.82)
11172
(65.18)
91595
(29.31)
220904
(70.69)
1999-00 9853
(32.82)
20167
(67.18)
129286
(28.33)
327130
(71.67)
2000-01 11063
(33.16)
21856
(66.39)
135699
(28.40)
342119
(71.60)
2001-02 13183
(37.11)
22338
(62.89)
147709
(27.45)
390470
(72.55)
2002-03 11522
(31.38)
25192
(68.62)
154213
(26.40)
430029
(73.60)
2003-04 12889
(29.98)
30097
(70.02)
177736
(25.87)
509280
(74.13)
2004-05 14934
(29.73)
35302
(70.27)
201912
(22.57)
692762
(77.43)
2005-06 19889
(32.38)
41539
(67.62)
251507
(22.68)
857653
(77.32)
Source: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, AP and CSO New Delhi
47
Appendix 6: Real Fixed Assets Per worker by States (Rs)
Formal (capital formation) Informal without DME State Informal with DME
1989-90 1994-
95
2000-
01
1989-
90
1994-
95
2000-
01
89
-
90
1994-
95
2000-
01
Andhra
Prades
h
154316 25454
8
235606 4089 5243 10281 - 5970 11501
Gujarat 243629 44301
4
889661 15867 20156 31311 - 19859 32146
Karnata
-ka
186539 26034
6
500914 5622 7611 13696 - 8345 16247
Mahara
-shtra
300772 41727
8
564624 10982 18932 29033 - 28445 35614
Orissa 590072 76158
2
790651 1916 1751 3372 - 2073 3729
Tamil
Nadu
178805 27352
8
276399 5403 4509 18619 - 6906 23618
West
Bengal
181678 33596
5
258653 2912 3227 6353 - 3820 7894
All
India
240626 18505
4
441981 6828 6739 15043 - 16592 18964
Source: ASI and NSS 5
Appendix 7: Some Selected State wise Granted Industrial Licenses and Investment,
Employment Proposals in India during August 1991-February 2008
State No.s
Granted
Proposed
Investment
(Rs. In crores)
Proposed
Employment
(Numbers)
AP 511
(11.74)
14976
(11.56)
89395
(9.63)
Orissa 37
(0.85)
5444
(4.2)
11882
(1.28)
WB 101
(2.32)
4155
(3.21)
20706
(2.23)
Maharashtra 586
(13.47)
18748
(14.48)
132898
(14.31)
Gujarat 465
(10.69)
23385
(18.06)
75630
(8.14)
Tamil Nadu 850
(19.54)
13723
(10.6)
149108
(16.06)
Karnataka 270
(6.21)
10502
(8.11)
75861
(8.17)
Source: Indiastat.com
Note 1: figures refer to the Letter of Intents and Direct Industrial Licenses
2. Percentages are given in the parenthesis
48
Appendix 8: Total Employment in 1981, 2001
Industrial
Classification
Sectors 1981 2001
22 manufacture of tobacco and tobacco
products
14.83 19.80
23+24+25 manufacture of cotton textiles, jute, hemp,
wool, silk, synthetics fiber textiles
17.78 16.10
26 manufacture of textile products(including
wearing apparel other than footwear)
11.04 12.60
27 manufacture of wood and wood products,
furniture and fixtures
12.98 12.66
32 manufacture of non-metallic mineral
products
8.89 5.27
Source: Census of AP, 1981, 2001
Appendix 9: Labour Productivity in AP during 1980-81 to 1992-93 in Registered
Manufacturing
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
1980-81
1981-82
1982-83
1983-84
1984-85
1985-86
1986-87
1987-88
1988-89
1989-90
1990-91
1991-92
1992-93
O/L
Source: Calculations based on the data from ASI, Govt. of AP, Various Issues
49
Appendix 10: Labour Productivity in AP (1993-94 – 2003-04) in Registered
Manufacturing
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
1996-97
1997-98
1998-99
1999-2000
2000-01
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
Series1
Source: Calculations based on the data from ASI, Govt. of AP, Various Issues
Appendix 11: Annual Gross Value Added per Worker (In Rs.) by States/UTs
(Product Approach), 2001
State GVA (in Rs. Per worker)
Rural Urban
Andhra Pradesh 9324 18637
Gujarat 16987 34643
Karnataka 10403 21055
Kerala 16484 28422
Orissa 4814 15138
Maharashtra 15128 33025
Uttar Pradesh 10083 18923
West Bengal 10216 19539
Tamil Nadu 11979 22740
India 11120 25598
50
Appendix 12: Relative Share of Number of Factories, NVA, Fixed Capital and
Number of Employees of Select Factory Sector (2-Digit Classification) 2003-04
(Percent)
Industry No. of
Factories
Net Value
Added
Fixed Capital No .of
employees
food products
and beverages
(15)
44.50 14.61 17.52 18.12
tobacco (16) 2.97 7.41 1.07 13.08
manufacture of
coke, refined
petroleum
products (23)
0.28 7.72 6.36 0.19
chemical
products (24)
5.83 19.37 15.21 6.10
non-metallic
mineral
products (26)
17.39 8.30 14.42 20.97
basic metals
(27)
2.91 13.19 20.95 3.24
machinery (31) 1.74 5.61 2.08 2.50
Source: ASI, Government of AP, 2003-04
51
Appendix 13: Road Length per 100 sq. km of area for select states of India
1980-81 1989-90 1990-91 1995-96 As on 31st
March,
1999
As on 31st
March,
2003
AP 45.73
(13)
53.7
(14)
54.2
(14)
62.77
(15)
65.2
(14)
71.32
(14)
Gujarat 29.63
(16)
50.6
(15)
53.0
(15)
68.28
(13)
47.6
(18)
70.20
(15)
Karnataka 57.25
(9)
65.0
(11)
66.0
(12)
74.43
(12)
79.2
(12)
79.57
(13)
Maharashtra 57.58
(8)
70.3
(9)
72.0
(9)
116.76
(6)
124.1
(6)
86.92
(11)
Orissa 76.51
(6)
125.6
(5)
125.8
(5)
135.02
(5)
168.6
(3)
152.23
(5)
Tamil Nadu 95.31
(2)
149.9
(3)
151.2
(3)
158.16
(3)
117.7
(8)
127.68
(6)
West Bengal 63.85
(7)
69.2
(10)
69.3
(10)
87.41
(8)
89.3
(11)
103.69
(10)
All India 46 64.1 65.2 73.03 76.8 74.73
Source: Statistical Abstract of AP, Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Govt. Of
AP, Various Issues
Appendix 14: Number of Strikes normalised by the number of factories for some
selected states in India
1980-81 1988-89 1995-96 2000-01 2004-05
Factories Strikes Factories Strikes Factories Strikes Factories Strikes Factories Strikes
AP 11155
357
(0.03)
14292
238
(0.02)
18500 120
(0.01)
14029 27
(0.00)
15572 20
(0.00)
Gujarat 11208 241
(0.02)
11103 169
(0.02)
13770 105
(0.01)
14090 67
(0.00)
13603 29
(0.00)
Karnataka 5381 44
(0.01)
5649 52
(0.01)
6701 18
(0.00)
7010 33
(0.00)
7596 4
(0.00)
Maharashtra 15576 267
(0.02)
15127 108
(0.01)
20536 89
(0.00)
18528 26
(0.00)
18912 7
(0.00)
Orissa 1563 116
(0.07)
1430 50
(0.03)
1790 42
(0.03)
1665 21
(0.01)
1749 3
(0.00)
Tamil Nadu 10292 277
(0.03)
13099 194
(0.01)
19895 120
(0.01)
20601 109
(0.01)
21053 59
(0.00)
West Bengal 6359 185
(0.03)
5419 42
(0.01)
6482 12
(0.00)
6091 22
(0.00)
6105 20
(0.00)
Source: (1) Indian Labour Year Book, Govt. Of India, Ministry of Labour and
Employment, Labour Bureau, Several Years
(2) Annual Survey of Industries, CSO, Several years
52
Appendix 15: Number of Lock Outs normalised by the number of factories for some
selected states in India
1980-81 1988-89 1995-96 2000-01 2004-05
Factories Lock
outs
Factories Lock
outs
Factories Lock
outs
Factories Lock
outs
Factories Lock
outs
AP 11155
3
(0.00)
14292
92
(0.01)
18500 139
(0.01)
14029 46
(0.00)
15572 4
(0.00)
Gujarat 11208 17
(0.00)
11103 19
(0.00)
13770
16
(0.00)
14090 8
(0.00)
13603 7
(0.00)
Karnataka 5381 7
(0.00)
5649 13
(0.00)
6701
11
(0.00)
7010 10
(0.00)
7596 2
(0.00)
Maharashtra 15576 23
(0.00)
15127 69
(0.00)
20536
23
(0.00)
18528 6
(0.00)
18912 2
(0.00)
Orissa 1563 10
(0.00)
1430 7
(0.00)
1790
3
(0.00)
1665 5
(0.00)
1749 3
(0.00)
Tamil Nadu 10292 34
(0.00)
13099 20
(0.00)
19895
18
(0.00)
20601 40
(0.00)
21053 15
(0.00)
West Bengal 6359 146
(0.02)
5419 138
(0.03)
6482
45
(0.01)
6091 155
(0.03)
6105 185
(0.03)
Source: (1) Indian Labour Year Book, Govt. Of India, Ministry of Labour and
Employment, Labour Bureau, Several Years
(2) Annual Survey of Industries, CSO, Several years
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